Special Report: Al Qaeda's Crisis of Succession

By Laura Mansfield

Al Qaeda Inc. is not just a buzzword; the term is very descriptive of the form the global terror organization has taken as it has evolved over the years into a global franchise with activities throughout much of the world. Its projects have ranged from spectacular events like the September 11 attacks to epic fails and no-shows.Its recruiting grounds range from mosques of all sizes in many countries to the internet, where a wide range of forums in multiple languages tries to find a way to hook in new followers.

Until now, the name Osama Bin Laden has been synonymous with Al Qaeda.It was founded by him, and he has been its de facto CEO for its entire lifespan.Much of its funding, especially in the early days, came from Bin Laden's vast personal fortune.

Today Al Qaeda faces its greatest challenge ever after Sunday's spectacular decapitation strike on Bin Laden. Thanks to a comBination of good intelligence, strategic planning, and courageous and accurate military action, Osama Bin Laden is no more.

Where does that leave Al Qaeda?

That's the big question today.There is no well-defined line of succession, at least not one that has been exposed to public view.It appears that Bin Laden never appointed a successor, an oversight that may have fatal consequences for Al Qaeda.

So who then is poised to take over the reins of the organization, and preside over its reorg?

There are severalmembers of Al Qaeda leadership who have taken a visible role, either in middle management,on the battlefield, or in its trademark As Sahab videos.

Some analysts have speculated that the fact that Al Qaeda has not crowned its new "Emir" is an indication of a power struggle for control of the organization.

That is certainly plausible; it is equally possible that the remaining leadership core is facing significant communications challenges.It isn't likely that they can call a "caBinet" meeting of sorts with the US following hot on the trail of leads from the Bin Laden raid intelligence, and they are likely exercising extreme care in the use of telephones and the internet.

There is no doubt that Osama Bin Laden's death has dealt a harsh blow to the organization.It remains to be seen whether or not it is a mortal blow.Bin Laden earned much of his mettle out in the field battling the Soviets in Afghanistan.Much of his legitimacy came from his work in what is seen by the jihadists as their great victory over one of the infidel superpowers, the Soviet Union.

Since 2001, Bin Laden has largely been a leader in absentia, disappearing for months and years at a time.During those absences, many speculated that the terror leader might be dead.In the absence of an announcement confirming his death, the rank and file of Al Qaeda carried on business as usual, with confidence that their leader still lived.

Regardless of whether Bin Laden was alive or dead, the prevailing view among analysts was that he was likely isolated and no longer in direct control of the organization.His infrequent messages showed that he was following current events, yet there was delay between the events and his messages referencing those events.This appeared to indicate that Bin Laden was in a remote location where communications were limited.For years, it has been assumed that information flowed to and from Bin Laden via a series of couriers.

We know now that since 2005, Bin Laden has been living in a compound in Abbottabad.The evidence recovered from Bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad by SEAL Team Six indicated that Bin Laden may not have been as out of touch with the day to day operations of the organization as many thought.

This makes the death of Bin Laden a much more critical issue that it would be otherwise.

For years, it was widely believed that Al Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al Zawahiri was in day to day control of the terror group.Many believed Bin Laden has been reduced to simply a figurehead who released a message from time to time to maintain morale.

In the last few years, drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan have continued to pick off key Al Qaeda commanders.The death of Mustafa abu al-Yazid, Al Qaeda's paymaster, and explosives expert Abu Khabbab al Masri were major strikes.Other major Al Qaeda players have been captured, including Khalid Sheikh Muhammad and Abu Faraj al Libi.

These blows have considerably attritted the pool of potential leaders.

Names currently being thrown around as possible leaders include Ayman al Zawahiri and Abu Yahya al Libi, yet those are not likely to be able to lead the Al Qaeda we know today.

Bin Laden's successor is going to face significant challenges.One of the most significant challenges is going to be funding for the group.In many ways, Al Qaeda functions as a business.It has payroll to meet, operating expenses, and it must continually restock its military equipment and supplies.In addition, it has historically paid for travel expenses for its followers; at one point, Al Qaeda actually had an employee handbook listing benefits such as travel.Funding for new terror attacks also must be addressed.

Bin Laden had many admirers and contacts dating back to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union.After his personal fortune was seized by Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden was able to leverage these contacts to provide a continuous source of funds.This became even more critical after the September 11, 2001 attacks, when the money trail to Bin Laden faced continuous scrutiny.

The new Al Qaeda leader is going to need to be an effective fundraiser.

Al Qaeda's new "Emir" is also going to need to have a strong personality; the Al Qaeda organization has deep fractures within, and each of those factions has a leader of his own.

The new leader will have to find a way to consolidate the factions, and reunify the organization.

In the last two decades Al Qaeda has become a global clearinghouse of sorts, a command and control organization for smaller radical groups such as those in Yemen and Saudi Arabia, North Africa, Somalia, and Gaza.Without a strong central leader, these fragments will become more autonomous, and any funds that they might raise would no longer flow upwards to Al Qaeda central.

In addition, Bin Laden's successor must deal with rivalry in the regions. Groups like the Taliban, the TTP (Taliban Pakistan), and their offshoots pose competition for power in the regional arena.Without a strong, unifying leader, these groups may pursue their own separate agendas.

Let's take a look at each of these potential Al Qaeda successors, and assess the likelihood of each of these men taking control of the Al Qaeda as leader of the Global jihad.

Ayman al Zawahiri: Heir Apparent?

Many analysts believe that Bin Laden's second-in-command Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri will assume control of Al Qaeda Central. Zawahiri certainly is the most visible among the candidates for the leadership role.He releases video and audiotapes quite frequently.During one time period, there were so many messages from Zawahiri that the host of a TV news show quipped on air to then-Vice President Dick Cheney that Zawahiri was on TV more than he was.

Many believe that Zawahiri has acted as the de factor leader of Al Qaeda over the years, although that interpretation is now open to question with intelligence recovered from the Bin Laden raid.

Zawahiri, like Bin Laden, is a long-time jihadist.He served time in prison in Egypt for his role in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, and then went to Afghanistan to join the jihad against the Soviets. He formally merged Egyptian Islamic Jihad with Bin Laden's Al Qaeda in June 2001, solidifying years of cooperation between the two groups.

But Zawahiri is not well liked and is seen by many as a divisive element in Al Qaeda.His ideology of jihad is even more extreme than Bin Laden and may have been a role in the evolution of Bin Laden's strategies.

Let's face it, Zawahiri may be the brains of Al Qaeda and may have wielded considerable influence over Bin Laden, but he just doesn't have the charisma of Osama. Nor does he have the charismatic appeal of a Zarqawi or even a Moqrin, all of whom had strong followers before their deaths.

Although Zawahiri's messages are key elements in the Al Qaeda "marketing communications" program, they just aren't doing the job of rallying the troops.He does not reach the new generation of jihadists, and that is going to be essential for Al Qaeda's survival as a global entity, especially in the face of increasing competition from rival and splinter groups in the absence of Bin Laden.

Zawahiri may have the advantage of experience, and the respect of the older generations of jihadists, even if they don't particularly like him.

Can Ayman Zawahiri reach the new generation?He has certainly tried, releasing video tapes on a continuous basis over the years, and even taking questions over the internet and answering them in a two-part video.But quite frankly there is little excitement among the internet jihadists when a Zawahiri message is released.He may be able to take over operational control, but given his age and his lack of charisma, it's unlikely that he can inspire a new generation to take on jihad.

There is little doubt that there was competition between Bin Laden and Zawahiri; some reports speculate that Zawahiri may somehow have knowingly violated OPSEC and given up Bin Laden's location. egardless, for over a decade Zawahiri has been content to be known as the number two man.There may be a very good reason for that. Zawahiri simply doesn't have the leadership or people skills, or the fundraising ability to take over the top role.

He would be more effectove either as the second-in-command or perhaps as a member of a coalition leadership with someone like Al Libi.

If Zawahiri takes over as leader of Al Qaeda, then there is one key thing Al Qaeda must do to survive short term or long term.It needs to borrow the words of Donald Trump, and address them to Zawahiri:"You're fired!"

Abu Yahya al Libi: Rising Star?

In 2007, Abu Yahya al Libi was Al Qaeda's rising star. Al Qaeda sympathizers on jihadist messages boards were stressing out about the absence of Bin Laden.There was considerable angst beginning to appear among the jihadists; there had been no message from Bin Laden in nine months. Yet Bin Laden had gone much longer without a message, without causing any discernible discomfort among his supporters.At the time, it appeared that the reason was the leadership vacuum Al Qaeda has experienced since that period, and which is now exacerbated by the death of Bin Laden. Al Libi appeared poised to try to fill this role.

During the sixteen-month period from 2004 through early 2006 when there was no sign of Bin Laden, other charismatic men were steering the global jihad - men like Abu Mus'ab al Zarqawi, who was commanding headlines with his exploits in Iraq and drawing new recruits into the global jihad like flies to honey. For much of this period, issues of Sawt al Jihad and Moaskar al Battar were being published regularly on the internet by Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula. The Al Qaeda propaganda machine had no problems finding adequate material to keep the troops focused.

After Zarqawi was killed, no one had really stepped up to the plate to motivate the masses.Attempts by Ayman al Zawahiri were met with a lukewarm response at best.For many months, it has looked like that Abu Yahya al Libi was attempting to step in to this leadership vacuum.

Abu Yahya Al Libi is considered by many jihadists to be a true mujahid imam, an Islamist preacher who has also earned his stripes on the battlefield.

Al Libi's big claim to fame is his escape from American custody in Afghanistan in 2005. He was being held at a prison in Bagram, Afghanistan, when he and three other jihadist detainees broke out of the facility. His three fellow escapees have either been killed or recaptured, yet al Libi continues to elude US forces.

This escape has earned him a considerable amount of respect among his fellow jihadists, who view his escape as a victory over the Americans.

Al Libi has appeared in numerous videos through As Sahab since his escape.His rhetoric has become more and more inciting; in July 2006, he called on his followers to attack the White House. He has also called for the group to acquire and use weapons of mass destruction. Al Libi has written letters to Zarqawi, issued fatwas against the regimes of Denmark and Afghanistan, and delivered Eid messages to the Islamic Ummah.

His physical appearance in these videos has changed too; now he is shown with AK47 at his side, much like Bin Laden and Zawahiri.In many cases, As Sahab translates the videos into English and provides English subtitles and transcripts for the messages, a feature normally found in videos of Bin Laden or Zawahiri.

Using the tapes featuring Al Libi that were produced by As Sahab as an indicator, it becomes apparent that Al Libi has moved up in the leadership chain in the Al Qaeda organizational charts.

Bin Laden's followers need a leader; Abu Yahya al Libi seems to be willing and able to take his place. He seems to have some sort of official sanction from Al Qaeda, otherwise As Sahab would not be releasing his tapes in the manner that they are.

Can Al Libi fill this role?

Al Libi does not have well established connections to the Al Qaeda's global funding network.

His speeches bog down in Islamic rhetoric.Although this may appeal to some, the new generation of jihadists belongs to the MTV generation.Like youth worldwide, they tend to respond best to short sound bites, not hour long sermons.

Most importantly, Al Libi is does not have the charisma of a Bin Laden.It takes a strong constituent base to consolidate power, and Al Libi most likely does not have that kind of following.It is possible for Al Libi to forge a coalition of sorts with someone like Zawahiri, and perhaps be part of a leadership team, but it's unlikely that he will emerge as CEO of Al Qaeda.

An Al Qaeda under Al Libi's leadership is likely to lose much of its global reach.Although Al Libi does have ambitious aspirations (his calls for attacks on the White House and for the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons for example) he does not have the leadership skills to carry out these ambitions.

Adam Gadahn aka Azzam al Amriki: Really?

Occasionally someone floats the name of Adam Gadahn (Azzam al Amriki), the Orange County, California-born convert who embraced the jihad.

That's extremely unlikely.

Although he's been around Al Qaeda since the pre-9/11 days, he's not widely trusted among jihadists.He has played a key role in the video production efforts of Al Qaeda, and he does release messages of his own from time to time.

He has little or no following among jihadists, and is seen more as a novelty to them.

He cannot complete for leadership of new recruits from the west; he does not have the charisma of someone like Anwar Awlaki.

Most in the west consider Adam Gadahn to be somewhat of a pompous buffoon, and don't take him seriously.

If this were Celebrity Apprentice, Gadahn would be fired in round one.

Anwar Awlaki: Crown Prince or Pretender?

The name Anwar Awlaki is being thrown around by many as a possible successor to Bin Laden. On one level, it looks like Al Qaeda's days as the controller of the Global Jihadist movement may be ending.There appears to be a new light on the horizon in the form of American-born imam Anwar Awlaki.He is American-born but of Yemeni descent, and nicely bridges the gap between the two cultures. He is currently the rising star in the jihadist world, with enough charisma to motivate and inspire the rising generation of jihadists.He appeals to would-be followers in Europe and the US as well as in traditionally Muslim countries.

Awlaki has gained a fair amount of "street cred" with a string of attacks that he has reportedly inspired or directed, including the failed toner cartridge attempt, and the failed attempt by Nigerian underwear bomber AbdulMutallab.

Awlaki also has the ability to address another concern that Global Jihad must face - money.Although Bin Laden lost access to his personal fortune that helped bankroll the organization in its early days, in recent years his contacts and his messages have kept Al Qaeda funded.Its unlikely Zawahiri or Al Libi would be effective at fundraising.There is little doubt that Awlaki can effectively raise funds for the group through various methods.

He has a large following especially on the internet, and his followers are loud and vocal.If Awlaki wants to take control of the Global Jihad, he will need to move quickly to leverage his position, and his primary way to do it is through the internet.

Youth and converts who formerly were drawn to Bin Laden will instead become Awlaki supporters, especially in the West, again, through the internet.

But in many ways, the internet is the only place that Awlaki exists anymore for all intents and purposes.He is the world's first cyber-created terrorist leader.And he's created enough of a splash that he has become the first US citizen targeted for assassination in the War on Terror.

In many ways, Awlaki's rise to fame reminds of me the 2004 movie Pixel Perfect, where a computer generated hologram becomes a world famous singer, or of the more recent (and real) Japanese hologram singer, who has actually held concerts in addition to her YouTube videos.

Awlaki has a history of promoting radicalism.In the years leading up to the September 11, 2001 attacks, Awlaki served as Imam at the Ar-Ribat al-Islami Mosque in San Diego, and at Dar al Hijrah Mosque in Falls Church, VA , serving as a spiritual advisor to 9/11 hijackers Hani Hanjour, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Khalid al-Mihdhar.Ramzi Bin al-Shibh (the "20th hijacker") had Awlaki's phone number when his apartment was raided after the 9/11 attacks.

Awlaki also has the dubious distinction of being the only terrorist leader with a history of vice arrests.This man who followed an ideology so strict that he refused to shake hands with women was arrested twice in San Diego on charges of Soliciting for Prostitution. Between the two cases, he was sentenced to completing an AIDS education program, and paying $464, and three years' probation.

It's not clear where Awlaki obtained his credentials.His undergraduate degree is in Engineering, and he never completed his PhD in Human Resources Management.According to his own website, the sum total of his Islamic training is make up of several months of erratic study with several Muslim scholars, and self-training through reading the writings of other Muslim scholars. This shows in his sermons, article, and fatawa.He mixes his scholars and schools of Islamic jurisprudence much in the same way that someone not truly familiar with US history would comBine the writings of Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter,lumping them together as like-minded.It is puzzling that this has received as little attention as it has.

His lack of formal education hasn't held him back on the internet.He has developed a strong cyber-following among young men and women in the West. At least it looks that way.

He apparently has his own promoter/marketing specialist, or at least someone who wants to maintain Awlaki's high level of visibility.Every morning, dozens of copies of old Awlaki video and audio sermons are posted on YouTube, and on blogs around the internet.No new material is posted - just the same material day in and day out.It's unclear as to whether these are the efforts of one person, a handful of people, or a larger following.

What's interesting is that all of these sermons are old - many dating back before 2001.Very little in the way of writings containing Islamic guidance has come out of Awlaki since he went to Yemen in 2004.

In the past two years, Awlaki apparently decided to start writing again.His new focus is on jihad and his specialization is inspiring the murder of western "kuffars".He's been successful at just that - inspiring murder.

Fortunately his devotees have not turned out to be particularly competent.In many ways, they were misfit souls looking for a light in their darkness.Cult leaders have always capitalized on this kind of psychological weakness;these Awlaki-"inspired" murdered would simply have found another leader if Awlaki wasn't around.

Depite this, Awlaki has managed to spin failure into success over and over again.The underwear bomber who tried to blow up a Northwest Airlines flight in an epic fail of a terror attempt on Christmas Day 2009 was supposedly trained by Awlaki.The toner cartridge bomb scheme, where laser printer cartridges were turned into bombs designed to bring down airliners, was Awlaki's most recent claim to fame.This too was a failure.So was the British passenger plane plot, the threats against the cartoonist, and the attempted Times Square bomBing by Faisal Shahzad.

In fact the only two Awlaki-inspired terror acts have actually harmed anyone:the 2010 stabBing of a British caBinet minister in 2010, and the murder of 12 servicemen and women at Fort Hood, Texas.He also threatened numerous cartoonists, and his threats about her cartoons drove a Seattle woman into changing her name and going into hiding at the request of the FBI after Awlaki issued a Fatwa calling for her death.

The "Anwar Awlaki Internet Fan Club", ostensibly run by an American from Charlotte, NC named Samir Khan, puts out Inspire.Despite the fact the Khan has no graphics art or publishing experience or training, every other month he manages to produce a 50-plus page internet equivalent of a high-gloss magazine complete with fancy graphics and flashy page design.The magazine never fails to garner extensive press coverage, yet it rarely consists of much in the way of original material.The magazine gloats about successes, spins failures into successes, and reprints messages by Gaddahn, Zawahiri, and Bin Laden.The last few issues have plagiarized the book "Architect of Global Jihad" by Brynjar Lia, copying Lia's translation of the writings of Abu Musab al Suri.

What's particularly interesting about this publication is that Awlaki has neither acknowledged the existence of Inspire, despite the fact that it bears the Al Malahem logo. In fact, his most recent Inspire article justifies criminal activities in the west to fund jihad- something we've never seen Awlaki support in any of his previous messages and sermons.Awlaki has remained silent on this article too.

There's no question that Awlaki has an internet following.But what kind of following does he have in real life?Several news agencies have interviewed people on the streets of Yemen after Friday prayers, asking them their opinion of Awlaki.Most had never heard of him.

Despite the daily uploading of the same Awlaki videos over and over again, there seems to be little or no new material coming from Awlaki, other than his occasional cheerleading videos calling for kuffars, especially Americans, to be killed.

What is truly missing from Awlaki is the kind of interactivity other radical imams have.They deliver sermons, answer questions on forums, and even participate in Question and Answer sessions on Paltalk.Even Zawahiri, with a $25 million bounty on his head, managed to do an internet "town hall" meeting with his supporters, who posted their questions on a specific jihadist forum.Shortly afterwards, Zawahiri answered questions in a two part video.

What are the chances Awlaki's Western internet following will follow him onto the battlefield long-term?How long will a generation of fighters who have been raised on video games remain willing to go into battle where instead of losing a virtual life, the follower stands to either be killed or face a lengthy prison term?It's likely that once his followers realize that jihad is not a video game that they can just do-overwith new lives by simply restarting the game that the jihad may lose some of its appeal.

Awlaki has been successful raising funds in the past, and that is an important strength.Whether he can do so in today's climate is nothing more than speculation.

Although he does have internet promoters, they lack depth.In many cases, it appears that many of these followers are simply intelligence services trying to "buy into" Awlaki's group by winning his favor.

He also lacks follow-through.His fan magazine and its articles attributed to him remain unacknowledged and some question whether it is even produced by Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula.

Is it possible that Awlaki and his terror spinoff, Al Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, could assume a more prominent role in leading the Global Jihad, eclipsing the legacy Al Qaeda group in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

That remains to be seen.But I can't shake the feeling that like in the Wizard of Oz, someone is going to pull back the curtain on Awlaki, and like the Great and Powerful Oz, will not be what he appears to be.

The Future

Family businesses often face serious crises after the patriarch dies; his heirs often cannot sustain the same sense of excitement that the original owner did. This is true for most types of businesses, and is true also for Al Qaeda, at least the Afghanistan-Pakistan branch.As the generation of jihadists who followed Bin Laden to Afghanistan pre-9/11 dies off, martyrs themselves, retires, or simply gets tired of the demands of jihad, the focal point for Global Jihad is likely to shift to Yemen.

Not every reorg is successful in maintaining the core business; that's likely the case with Al Qaeda.

Throughout the last two decades, Al Qaeda under the leadership of Osama Bin Laden has been able to act as an umbrella group, pulling together small regional extremists groups in Egypt, Libya, Somalia, Algeria, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other countries into a coalition of terror.

Those days may very well be over.

The real problem is there are no effective candidates to replace Osama Bin Laden.

The most likely successor to Bin Laden remains Zawahiri.Despite his limitation, there remains a high probability that he will be appointed,If that happens, Zawahiri's deficiencies are likely to lead over the relatively short term to a decline in Al Qaeda's role as leading the Global Jihad,

Unless a real leader emerges quickly, Al Qaeda as we know it is on its way to obsolesce, leaving in its wake fragmented regional, national, and even ethic jihadist organizations fighting each other more than they fight the "kuffars".

The violence will continue, but in a more anarchic fashion. The world will not be a safer place without Al Qaeda; instead, it may become a more dangerous place as individual groups all pursue their own individual agendas.There will be no Global Jihad Central Command to coordinate activities.It will be every group for itself, and each man for himself.